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In its proposalsfor a new bankruptcy act, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws frequently recommends that federal bankruptcy power be exercised to write a new set of debtor-creditorrules which will be applicable
only in bankruptcy courts. (The Bankruptcy Judges in their proposed
Bankruptcy Act do likewise.) Professor Shanker argues that these recommendations exercise the federal bankruptcy power in an unwise and counterproductivefashion. He asserts that (1) they will cause uncertainty and
instability in legal relationships since the parties will not know the law
which ultimately will govern, and (2) they will bring about tension-creating
situations in which the existence of conflicting nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy law will result in the parties maneuvering to enter or avoid bankruptcy for reasons totally inconsistent with the objectives of the bankruptcy
system. Professor Shanker suggests that the Bankruptcy Commission
made these errors because of an unduly narrow perspective of the debtorcreditor universe and because of its failure to appreciate the appropriate
and unique role of the bankruptcy system in that universe. If reform of
nonbankruptcy law is needed, then Professor Shanker urges that this be
accomplishedfor all (not just bankruptcy) purposes through state or general
federal legislation.

* The Author: Morris G. Shanker (B.S.E.E., Purdue University; M.B.A., J.D.,
University of Michigan) is the John Homer Kapp Professor of Law at Case Western
Reserve University and has been a Visiting Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan, University of California (Berkeley), Wayne State University, and the
University of London, England. His teaching specialties include Commercial Law,
Creditors' Rights, and Property Security. He is admitted to the Ohio Bar and, prior
'to entering full-time teaching, practiced law in Cleveland, Ohio for 10 years.
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bodies.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

I.

ABUSE -

[Vol. 26:3

THE QUESTIONABLE FEDERALISM IN THE
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT

A.

Unfortunate Tensions

T HE

BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION proposes to exercise the
federal bankruptcy power in a way which is quite different from
the present situation.' The dominant and overriding theme of the
present bankruptcy act is that property rights and the basic debtorcreditor law created by nonbankruptcy sources will continue to be
recognized in bankruptcy. 2 If the bill proposed by the Bankruptcy
Commission is enacted, this dominant theme will be seriously
eroded. With far more frequency than is true today, the Bankruptcy
Commission proposes that the federal bankruptcy power be exercised to write completely new governing rules which are to apply
only in the bankruptcy courts. Consequently, in these situations,
one set of rules, the nonbankruptcy rules, would govern property
rights and the debtor-creditor relationship before bankruptcy; quite
another would govern in bankruptcy. This quite different approach
to the use of the federal bankruptcy power, if adopted, will bring
about curious and questionable results. Just how curious and how
questionable can be dramatized by the following playlet which might
well be entitled, "Bankruptcy and the Disappearing Dower."

1. See COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereafter cited as REPORT].
The Bankruptcy Judges have proposed an alternative bankruptcy bill. H.R. 32,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The comments in this paper are for the most part equally
applicable to it.
2. See, e.g., J. HANNA & J. MACLACHLAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CREDITORS' RIGHTS 283 (5th ed. 1957), who state the following: "The central idea of
bankruptcy is simple enough. The trustee succeeds to property owned by the bankrupt, as determined by state law of property, including contracts."
In Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 169 (1946), in which Mr.
Justice Frankfurter states:
Parties are in a bankruptcy court with their rights and duties already established, except insofar as they subsequently arise during the course of
bankruptcy administration or as part of its conduct. Obligations to be satisfied out of the bankrupt's estate thus arise, if at all, out of tort or contract
or other relationship created under applicable law. And the law that fixes
legal consequences to transactions is the law of the several States.
See 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.1, at 403
(1965) which states: "In general Congress has chosen [in the Bankruptcy Act] to do
no more than provide a mechanism for the distribution of assets of insolvent estates,
leaving to the background of state law the determination of the validity of property
rights and other claims to the assets."
See also Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pts. I & 2),
47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 407, 631 (1972).
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Scene 1
Time: The future
Place: State Court
Assignee for Benefit of Creditors: Your Honor, we would like to
distribute to creditors of this insolvent estate the proceeds of the
debtor-assignor's interest in his land, Blackacre. What is more,
we should like to do so free and clear of his wife's inchoate
dower interest. As you undoubtedly recognize, it is quite a
nuisance to have me compute and set off that inchoate dower
interest. What is more . . .
Judge (interrupting): Hold on there! So long as our state law recognizes inchoate dower as some kind of a property interest,
then it will be upheld in this court, notwithstanding the inconvenience to you in having to figure it out. There is something,
you know, to the legal principle that creditors are entitled to
be paid only from the property of their debtors, and not from
the property of third parties who don't owe the debts.'
Assignee: But, Judge, inchoate dower makes no sense today. It is
an old and archaic concept. Aren't creditors of the husband
more worthy than the wife's antiquated claim to dower?
Judge: I understand that a good many people in this world agree
with you. However, until you convince our state legislature of
your arguments, I cannot, simply for your convenience or upon
your representation-of the worthiness of your creditors, use the
wife's property to pay off the debts of her husband. Accordingly, you are to prepare an order allowing and setting off to
the wife the value of her inchoate dower interest before you
distribute to your creditors the proceeds of the husband's land.
Scene 2
Time: Same as Scene 1-the future
Place: Same state as Scene 1, but in the Bankruptcy Court across
the street
Trustee in Bankruptcy: Your Honor, we would like to distribute to
the creditors of this bankrupt estate the proceeds of the bankrupt's interest in his land, Blackacre. Moreover, we should like
to do so free and clear of his wife's inchoate dower interest.
Wife: But, your Honor, the value of the inchoate dower is my prop3. This principle is supported by many authorities. See, e.g., Mr. Justice
Black in Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135 (1962).
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erty; and everyone here has stipulated that I am in no way obligated to pay my husband's debts. Moreover, my inchoate
dower in this case is worth quite a bit, particularly when you
consider that I am only 30 years old and my 70-year-old bankrupt husband has become deathly ill as a result of this terrible
bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Judge: Sorry, madame, your points would be well taken
if you were across the street in the state court dealing with an
assignment for the benefit of your husband's creditors or a
levying creditor on your husband's land. But, as your lawyer
has probably told you, we now have a new Bankruptcy Act;
and section 4-601(c) says that you lost the inchoate dower interest that you might otherwise have had when your husband
filed for bankruptcy.4 So, what used to be the value of your
inchoate dower interest in Blackacre now belongs to your husband's creditors.
[Whispers, murmurs, and grumbling are heard in the courtroom.]
Creditors (whispering to each other): Saaay, I sure like this Bankruptcy Judge. Let's try to get into his courtroom just as often
as possible.
Bankrupt husband (murmuring to his wife): Why did I ever file this
stupid bankruptcy petition?
Wife (grumbling to her husband): We should have sold this land
and grabbed the money before you filed for bankruptcy.
End of Scenes
1.

The Message of this Paper

Exactly what is the message to be learned from these two scenes?
They were not intended to suggest that states ought to retain inchoate dower. Indeed, strong arguments have been made for its
elimination. 5 Nor were these scenes intended to suggest that the
Federal Bankruptcy Act should never be used to effect rights which
are otherwise available under nonbankruptcy (typically state) law.
Just when the Bankruptcy Act appropriatelymay do so in order to
4. A judge less sensitive to the wife's feelings might also have mentioned that
the wife economically would have been better off by being a widow. If the husband
had died before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, then the wife's dower interest
would no longer be inchoate but vested and, therefore, not subject to termination under
section 4-601(c) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act. REPORT pt. II, § 4-601(c).
5. The arguments for eliminating inchoate dower are found in the assignee's
statements in Scene 1 and were essentially lifted from id. § 4-601, Notes 11, 15 & 16.
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accomplish its unique objectives will be discussed later. What
these scenes are intended to dramatize is the effect of the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals wherein non-bankruptcy-created
rights (inchoate dower in these scenes) are denied validity only in
the bankruptcy court, but remain valid in all other forums where
creditor-debtor problems are adjudicated. As illustrated by the
whispers, murmurs, and grumbling at the end of Scene 2, this situation produces the following unfortunate tensions:
1. It encourages creditors to press for the bankruptcy of their
debtors, not because that is the last resort after all reasonable efforts
outside of bankruptcy to solve the debtor-creditor problem have been
exhausted. Rather, creditors are encouraged to precipitate an early
bankruptcy of their debtor simply to get an asset which otherwise
would not be available to them. Recall the creditors' whispers.
2. It discourages debtors from filing bankruptcy when, in fact,
that may well be the desirable solution to rid themselves of their
overburdening debts. Take a look at the husband's murmur.
3. It encourages the family unit to dispose of their assets, not
because that seems to be a sensible business or personal goal.
Rather, this will be done only because it avoids a severe monetary
disadvantage to the family unit which will result from the husband's
bankruptcy. Remember the wife's grumble.
To summarize: The Bankruptcy Commission's proposals frequently bring about what I will hereafter refer to as a tensioncreating situation. These words will be shorthand in this paper to
describe the mix of tensions, such as those illustrated above, wherein the parties' motives are strong (1) to precipitate or avoid bankruptcy for reasons that are not consistent with the unique purposes
and goals for which our bankruptcy system was established, 8 and
(2) to take precipitous action before bankruptcy, even though that
action may not be consistent with their best personal or business objectives. Such tension-creating situations, I submit, are not the kinds
of things which ought to be encouraged by our bankruptcy act.
And if this were not enough, the Commission's proposals also
create uncertainty and instability, since the various parties, i.e. the
debtor and his creditors, will be unable to predict at the inception of
their relationship what law will ultimately govern that relationship.
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, one can fairly predict that state
6. See text accompanying notes 55-76 infra.
7. And one should also keep in mind that under section 4-205(a) of the Commission's proposed Act only one creditor, who need allege only that the debtor is
unable to pay his current debts, is needed to file an involuntary petition in bankruptcy.
8. See text accompanying notes 55-76 infra.
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law will control the relationship, even if the consequences of that relationship are adjudicated in a bankruptcy court. 9 But, if the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals are adopted, one simply will not know
at the time of contracting just what law will eventually control.
That will depend entirely on the happenstance of whether the matter
is decided before or after bankruptcy. Such uncertainty regarding
the applicable law on which parties may rely is hardly a situation
which commends itself.
2.

The Better Solution

Even if one assumes (as did the Bankruptcy Commission) that
inchoate dower unfairly impacts upon the debtor-creditor relationship, then is there a better way of dealing with this evil than that
proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission which causes the tensioncreating situation already described? Indeed, there is! That better
solution is to attack this evil right at its source and to eliminate
it for all purposes, both within and without bankruptcy. This can
be achieved by following either of these alternatives:
1. Persuade the state legislatures to eliminate inchoate dower
against a husband's creditors. Indeed, such legislation, the Uniform Probate Code, has already been proposed and adopted in several states.10
2. Enact a general federal statute which will preempt state
law and eliminate inchoate dower for all debtor-creditor purposes.
Presumably, Congress would not adopt such preemptive federal legislation without giving due consideration to the role of the states in
marital matters under the federal system set up in our Constitution." However, where national objectives are being defeated by in9. "[E]very debt is contracted with reference to the rights of the parties thereto
under existing [state] exemption laws." Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S.
181, 189 (1902), quoting Mr. Chief Justice White in In re Deckert, 7 F. Cas. 334 (No.
3728) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1874). See also note 2 supra.
10. Both Alaska and Idaho have adopted the Uniform Probate Code. See
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005 to 13.36.100 (1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to
15-7-307 (1972).
11. Congress, at least on some occasions, has been reluctant to enact federal
preemptive legislation until the states were given the opportunity to try to solve a
problem normally assigned to them. For example, Congress deferred to the states
in the drafting of a Uniform Commercial Code rather than adopt a federal act. More
recently, Congress seems willing to permit the states to try to work out their own
versions of no-fault insurance for auto accidents before considering federal legislation.
See Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 16, 1975, at 3-A, col. 1, which reports that Attorney
General Edward Levi, in testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee,
"questioned the wisdom of imposing any plan for nationally regulated no-fault insurance at a time when many states are experimenting with their own no-fault
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appropriate and unresponsive state law, ample
precedent 12 already
3
statutes.'
exists for enacting federal preemptive
3.

The Bankruptcy Commission's Non-Solution

The Bankruptcy Commission follows neither of the above alternatives. Rather, it would have us embark upon some in-between
road in which federal power is used to "solve" the inchoate dower
evil only in the bankruptcy forum and in no other. That "solution"
is a cure which is probably worse than the disease. Indeed, it can
hardly be classified as a solution at all. Accepting, for argument's
sake, that inchoate dower does impact unfairly on the debtorcreditor relationship, then that evil will, under the Bankruptcy
Commission's approach, continue to exist in all nonbankruptcy situations. And this quantitatively amounts to a good many situations
-perhaps more than the Bankruptcy Commission may have conceived. Included are all state proceedings dealing with a debtor's
estate: e.g., assignments for the benefit of creditors, receiverships,
15
14
liquidations of insurance companies,
probate administration,
and enforcement of individual creditor process against a husband's
land. Indeed, the inchoate dower evil will be very much alive in
every federal forum other than the bankruptcy court. Thus, enforcesystems."

For a more complete report on Attorney General Levi's views, see 11

TRIAL, July/August, 1975, at 29.

12. There are many such federal preemptive statutes. Among those most recently adopted is the so-called Federal Warranty Act, more properly cited as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2301 et seq. (Supp. I, 1975).
13. With respect to debtor-creditor law, perhaps the most pertinent of such
federal statutes is the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970),
where federal power was used to preempt entirely the minimum wage exemptions
formerly available to debtors under state law.
14. Where a probate administration is under way, there is not going to be any
"inchoate dower." By this time, the inchoate dower would have become a vested
property interest in the widow and, therefore, not subject to termination under section 4-601(c) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act. Nevertheless, there are many other
examples, beyond inchoate dower, where the inapplicability of the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals to probate administration (in fact, decedent's estates are not even
eligible for bankruptcy, see REPORT, pt. I, at 184) very much contributes to and demonstrates the questionable use of federal power employed by the Bankruptcy Commission. See text accompanying note 17 infra. Thus, even though the present
discussion deals specifically with inchoate dower, it seems appropriate at this point to
mention probate administration as among those places where nonbankruptcy rules
would continue to apply even if the Commission's proposed Bankruptcy Act were
adopted.
15. Obviously, an insurance company has no wife who can claim inchoate
dower rights in its property. But again, these institutions are listed for the same
reasons set out with respect to the probate administration. See note 14 supra.
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ment in civil actions in the United States district courts of individual creditor claims and federal tax liens asserted against a husband
will be plagued by it. And, even beyond the federal courts, the inchoate dower evil would rear its head in federally administered
liquidations of insolvent banks, since the Bankruptcy Commission
has excluded them from federal bankruptcy eligibility.' 6 Perhaps
the crowning irony is that even trustees in bankruptcy seeking to
reach land interests belonging to their estates, e.g., a lien held by
the bankrupt against one of his nonbankrupt debtors, will find that
they are subject to whatever inchoate dower claims exist against
that land.
Thus, if inchoate dower is such an evil, then the Bankruptcy
Commission's proposals will not rid us of it. Indeed, worse than
presenting no solution at all to the problem, the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals are counterproductive in that they cause the
tension-creating situations which have already been discussednamely, a situation where the parties are motivated to maneuver
before bankruptcy, or to maneuver to precipitate or to avoid bankruptcy, for reasons that are entirely inconsistent with the unique
and basic objectives for which the bankruptcy system was developed.
B.

More Tension-Creating Situations

If the inchoate dower situation just discussed were the only example of a tension-creating situation found in the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals, then this paper need not have been written.
The problem could be dismissed as quantitatively insignificant.
The tension-creating situation could arise only in those states which
still recognize a wife's inchoate dower as some kind of a property
interest which is not available to her husband's creditors.' 7 And,
even in those states, the money amounts attributable to the value
of inchoate dower would not likely reach a high-enough level to
cause the parties to maneuver seriously for a favorable pre- or
post- bankruptcy advantage, unless the husband were a great deal
older than the wife.
However, the inchoate dower example does not stand alone.
Quite to the contrary, there are many more tension-creating situations which the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals will bring about.
16. See REPORT pt. I, at 195; pt. II, §§ 4-201, -204.
17. According to the Bankruptcy Commission there are only nine states that so
213(1),
hold. See REPORT pt. I at 195. See also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
at 170-17 (1966).
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Some by themselves-and certainly all of them collectively-present a
quantitative level of tension-creating situations which is too high to
be ignored. Here are some of them:
a. Exemptions. Perhaps the example which individually will
have the greatest quantitative impact is the Bankruptcy Commission's proposal regarding exemptions. In section 4-503, there is
set out a list of exempt property which will be applicable only in
bankruptcy, but not elsewhere. Thus, in states (e.g., Ohio) where
exemptions are significantly less than those proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission, it is hard to fathom why any individual debtor
would not fly for the bankruptcy door at the first sign of creditor
pressure. In these states, the debtor has so much to gain by filing
bankruptcy and, correspondingly, so little motive to seek resolution
of his problems outside of bankruptcy.13 Indeed, if the debtor
failed to seek this bankruptcy haven, one suspects it would be because he was not advised of its existence.
Looking at the creditor side of the coin in these states, the pressure is strong for them to move as quickly and as vigorously as
possible to enforce their state law remedies, in the hope that they
can thereby reach their debtor's assets before the bankruptcy bell
rings. Of course, in states (e.g., Texas) where exemptions are "better" than those set out in the Bankruptcy Commission bill, the roles
to be played by the debtor and creditor would be reversed. 9 But in
every state the motivation to resolve the problem outside of bankruptcy is much reduced. Instead, one party is strongly motivated
to race for the bankruptcy door while the other seeks to trip him
up before he makes it. Is this the kind of scenario which our
Bankruptcy Act should encourage?
I emphasize that this is not meant to be a criticism of the exemp18.

See, e.g., Kennedy, Limitations of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 IowA L.

REV. 445, 485 (1960), in which Professor Kennedy, executive director of the Bank-

ruptcy Commission, stated:
For all the antiquarianism, diversity, and inadequacies of state exemption
legislation, there seems to be no impelling need to impress a federal mold
on the exemptions recognizable in bankruptcy. Certainly it would be a
dubious approach to the problem of modernizing such legislation for Congress to confer exemptions beyond those recognized by state law. A new incentive for entering the gates of voluntary bankruptcy would be afforded.
Any proposal increasing the spate of wage-earner bankruptcies will be
viewed askance.
See also Holahan & Hemmings, Judicial Expansion of Exemptions in Bankruptcy,
80 COM. L.J. 102, 110 (March, 1975), who also recognized that the Bankruptcy
Commission's approach "would create new incentives for debtor or creditor to shop
the bankruptcy forum for more favorable outcome." These authors, however, find
little fault with this result.
19. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 18, at 452.
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tions which the Bankruptcy Commission has proposed. Quite to
the contrary, I personally regard them as an excellent model from
which to work in developing a sensible exemption law to govern
all debtor-creditor situations. My criticism is directed to the questionable and curious way by which the Bankruptcy Commission
used federal power to enact these exemptions only for bankruptcy purposes. As I have already pointed out with respect to my discussion
of inchoate dower,2° that approach will not solve the evil of "bad"
exemption laws. Those "bad" laws will continue to exist in the
significant number of debtor-creditor cases being resolved outside
of a bankruptcy court. 2' And, not only is this a "non-solution" to
"bad" exemption laws, it is entirely counterproductive because (1)
it generates another tension-creating situation where maneuvering to
get in or stay out of bankruptcy may become the paramount consideration, and (2) it leaves the parties at the time of contracting
uncertain as to whether the state or bankruptcy exemptions will
ultimately control.
b. Statutory Liens and Security Interests. Yet another example
of a tension-creating situation is found in section 4-606(a) of the
proposed act. There, the Bankruptcy Commission proposes the
elimination, again only in bankruptcy, of numerous statutory liens.
Undoubtedly, the most important of the statutory liens to be eliminated are those intended to secure payment of delinquent state and
federal income taxes. With such a situation facing a tax collector,
his motive quickly to assert and then precipitously to enforce these
liens before bankruptcy, while they will be fully valid, seems selfevident. Equally self-evident is the motive of the debtor's other
creditors to precipitate bankruptcy where the lien will be invalidated. (Distressingly, in this particular case, the debtor finds himself right in the middle of this nutcracker!) Again, the race for
the advantage (or disadvantage) of the bankruptcy court may become paramount to the determination of a sensible solution to the
debtor-creditor problem. And, again, neither set of parties knows
at the inception of the relationship what will be its ultimate rights.
A similar tension-creating situation will arise under section
4-503(f) where the Bankruptcy Commission proposes the invalidation, again only in bankruptcy, of non-purchase-money security
interests in household goods.2 2 Here, the competing parties become

20. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
21. A partial list of the federal and state forums where nonbankruptcy exemptions will control is set out in the text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
22. The "better" solution, i.e., invalidation of these security interests for all
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the finance company which can enforce a perfectly valid security
interest before bankruptcy, and the other creditors of the debtor
(or the debtor himself if he can claim the asset as exempt in bankruptcy) who can invalidate it by precipitating bankruptcy.
More of the same is found in section 4-406(2). There, the Commission proposes to subordinate, again only in bankruptcy, the claims
(whether secured or unsecured) of insiders of a corporate bankrupt,
even though the relative priority of those claims would be upheld
under general equitable principles and corporate and business law.
What a temptation this raises for other creditors to precipitate bankruptcy just to get this advantage! And, how discouraging this
rule makes it for insiders ever to advance monies which might have
entirely rescued the corporation from its financial stress.
c. Fraudulent Transfers and Spendthrift Trusts. Yet another
example of a tension-creating situation is found in section 4-608
where the Bankruptcy Commission has proposed a new fraudulent
transfer act. Again, it is a rule which will define what is a fraudulent transfer only in bankruptcy, but not in other forums. So again,
creditors are encouraged to precipitate a bankruptcy because that
might get for them a "fraudulently transferred" asset which they
could not otherwise reach. One may wonder why a transfer which
is perfectly valid and nonfraudulent under the governing law before bankruptcy suddenly should become invalid and fraudulent simply because bankruptcy takes place. But the purpose of this paper
is not to argue about the merits of the proposals which the Bankruptcy Commission has made. Rather, it is to question the wisdom
of a bankruptcy statute which makes it possible for creditors to obtain additional assets only in bankruptcy and thereby motivates them
to precipitate the process.
The tension-creating list may be continued with the Bankruptcy
Commission's treatment of spendthrift trusts. In bankruptcy, but
not elsewhere, they will be denied their full validity. Again, the
added encouragement this gives to creditors to precipitate a bankruptcy of the beneficiary seems evident.
Undoubtedly, one can expand even further the list of tensioncreating situations which the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals
purposes (see text accompanying n. 10 supra) has already been proposed in the 1974
text of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, section 5.116. Actually, this section
would not invalidate these security interests entirely. Rather, it would permit the
court to refuse enforcement of a non-purchase-money security interest in property
that was otherwise exempt if the "continued possession and use of the item is
necessary to avoid undue hardship." UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §
5.116(3).
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bring. But sufficient numbers have already been given to illustrate
that there are enough to cause concern.
C.

How Did It Happen?

How did this situation come about? Some of the reasons which
led the Commission to propose these tension-creating situations are
set out in its report. Their validity will now be discussed.
1.

Historical Precedent

In some cases, the Commission apparently felt that it was simply
following historical precedent. In other words, certain tensioncreating situations can already be found in the present Bankruptcy
Act. Thus, it appears that the Commission was not particularly
troubled to continue and, indeed, to enlarge upon them. One
example of a tension-creating situation found in the present Bankruptcy Act is section 67(d)23 which enacts, only for bankruptcy purposes, a slightly different version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Another example is found in section 67(c),24 which
denies full validity to a tax lien on personal property unaccompanied
by possession, even though that tax lien would be fully efficacious
outside of bankruptcy.
It goes without saying that errors of the past ought not be
perpetuated simply because they have existed.2 5 Further, it should
23. I1U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970).
24. Id. § 107(c)(3).
25. It is gratifying to note that the Commission in at least one place rejected a
bad historical precedent. Not all creditors recognized by nonbankruptcy law may
presently participate in strict bankruptcy proceedings, but only those whose claims
are "provable."
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970).
Thus, creditors whose claims are
"provable" are subject to the benefits and burdens of their debtor's bankruptcy
whereas the "nonprovable" creditors are not. Thus, a tension-creating situation is
presently generated wherein the parties are encouraged to seek (or avoid) bankruptcy
simply to take advantage of this senseless dichotomy. For example, negligent
bankrupts often avoid filing bankruptcy-even though that may be clearly called foruntil the negligence claim against them has been reduced to judgment. This is because an unliquidated tort claim may not be provable (and thus not dischargeable)
under sections 63(a)(7) and 63(d). Id. §§ 103(a)(7), (d). On the other hand, tort
claims which have been reduced to judgment are provable (and thus possibly dischargeable). Thankfully, the Bankruptcy Commission, following the lead already
set in the present Bankruptcy Chapters 10, 11, 12 and 13, would eliminate the senseless distinction between those creditors who are recognized by nonbankruptcy law
but not in bankruptcy. See REPORT Pt. I, at 213 (discussion); id. pt. II, § 4-403.
Unfortunately, the Commission waffled on this positive approach when it refused in its
proposals to recognize completely in bankruptcy certain claims which are otherwise
fully valid under state law. Id. pt. II, § 4-403(b) (particularly clause 6 which limits
the extent of landlord damage claims and clause 7 which limits the extent of an employee's damage claim). So, more tension-creating situations are born!
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be noted that the Bankruptcy Commission proposes an entirely different tune from that being played in the present Bankruptcy Act.
Under the present Act, the fundamental and overriding theme is that
property rights and the basic debtor-creditor law created by nonbankruptcy sources will continue to govern in bankruptcy.2 6 As
pointed out above, there are exceptions to this basic theme. But
these are very much exceptions, and their quantity and degree are
fairly nominal. Thus, referring back to the two examples just mentioned, section 67(d) 27 changes the state Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in only fairly minor details. Specifically, a different
definition of insolvency is used, a definition for determining the
time of the transfer is inserted, and bona fide transferees are protected only where they give "present fair equivalent value" rather
than "fair consideration. 28 Similarly, under section 67(c)(3),29
the lien for unpaid taxes on personal property unaccompanied by
possession is not ignored in bankruptcy. Rather, it continues to be
recognized. However, the payment thereof may be postponed if the
assets to which it attached are needed to pay the costs of administration and wage claims of the bankrupt.
Compare this with the new basic theme proposed by the Bankruptcy Commission. Its proposals would create many new situations
where nonbankruptcy law is interfered with; and when this is done,
the interference will be at a much higher level.
Illustrations of entirely new situations where nonbankruptcy
law is interfered with are the following:
(1) Inchoate dower rights, unaffected by the present Bankruptcy Act, will be eliminated.
(2) The nonpurchase money security interest in household
goods, unaffected by the present Act, will be eliminated.30
(3) State law exemptions, fully valid under the present Act,

26. See note 2 supra.
27. II U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970).
28. In states still operating under the Statute of Elizabeth rather than the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, section 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970), may
produce more purely bankruptcy changes than those set out in the text. But even
in these states, these changes are not likely to be significant since the basic drafting
approach to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was to codify and clarify the
better decisions under the Statute of Elizabeth rather than to change it fundamentally. "In most states, the [U.F.C.A.] if enacted will not so much change the law
as clearly define what heretofore has been indefinite." See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT, 7 UNIFORM LAWs ANNOTATED 424 (Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, 1970).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3) (1970).
30. Cf.UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.116, discussed in note 22 supra.
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will be eliminated in favor of a new set of exemptions operable only
in bankruptcy.
(4) Statutory liens for income taxes on real estate and personal
property accompanied by possession, unaffected by the present Act,
will be eliminated.
(5) Spendthrift trusts, unaffected by the present act, will be
severely restricted. 3'
(6) And so on.
Illustrations of situations where the degree of interference with
nonbankruptcy law is increased are the following:
(I) The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act will not be rearranged in detail. It will be entirely rewritten.32
(2) Liens for income taxes on personal property unaccompanied
by possession which may be postponed under the present Act will
be entirely eliminated.
(3) Claims, which today must pass state unconscionability standards to be allowed, will hereafter also have to33 measure up to a
newly imposed bankruptcy unconscionability test.
(4) And so on.
The point should be clear. While there are today some rather
low-keyed tension-creating situations generated by our Bankruptcy
Act, the Bankruptcy Commission's proposals will require that we do
our dancing to a basically new and significantly louder melody.
The fact that we have so far managed a trickle of tensions hardly
means that we can survive a flood of them. Just because we have

See REPORT pt. I, at 197.
32. The Bankruptcy Commission urges that its proposal will not produce many
substantive changes from the law presently found in section 67(d), 11 U.S.C. 107(d)
(1970).
Rather, the Commission states it was seeking merely to simplify and
eliminate the substantial complexity found in the present Bankruptcy Act. REPORT
pt. I, at 211.
Perhaps so. The fact remains, however, that the Commission chose to write an
entirely new fraudulent transfer act, rearranging words and adding new phrases not
found in any of our previous fraudulent transfer statutes. The likelihood is that this
experiment in statutory drafting will add something new to the field that was not
there before.
One might also note that the new fraudulent transfer statute proposed only for
bankruptcy in section 4-608 will be in addition to the power a trustee already has
to recover fraudulent transfers under nonbankruptcy law. See REPORT pt. II, § 4-608.
See also § 4-604(b), which is intended to replace § 70(e) of the present Bankruptcy Act,
I1 U.S.C. l10(e) (1970).
33. For a highly critical discussion of this approach, see Bernstein and Schwartz,
Section 4-403(b)(8) of the Proposed New Bankruptcy Act: Disallowance of "Unconscionable" Claims (Unpublished 1975) (Report to the Committee on Creditors of
the National Bankruptcy Conference).
31.
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till now tolerated the camel's nose under the tent door hardly means
that we will live comfortably with the camel right in the tent.
2.

Dislike of Nonbankruptcy Law

Perhaps the reason most often articulated by the Commission
to support its tension-creating proposals was its dislike for certain
features of the nonbankruptcy creditor-debtor law. Rather uncomplimentary words to describe these laws, such as "archaic," "no
sound justification," and the like are often used to support the Commission's broadside attack on them.34 However, assuming arguendo
that these nonbankruptcy laws are as evil as the Commission fears,
then is not the better solution the one which has already been suggested: that is, to repeal those laws for all debtor-creditor purposes
and not just for the bankruptcy court, either by state legislation or,
if necessary, by federal preemptive legislation.35 I need not repeat
my essential thesis that using the federal power to invalidate these
laws only in bankruptcy does not solve these evils and, indeed, is
counterproductive.
Since the Bankruptcy Commission was operating under federal
auspices, one is puzzled by its failure to suggest, at least in some
of these situations, the federal preemptive approach. The question
is particularly puzzling since that is the approach that so often is
now appearing on the scene.36
Was the Bankruptcy Commission deterred from suggesting federal preemptive legislation because it conceived its jurisdiction to be
limited to proposing only a bankruptcy statute? Rather unlikely,
34. Regarding exemptions, the Commission noted "state exemption laws seem
generally archaic and some unduly generous in some states and exceeding niggardly,
particularly as to urban residents, in others." REPORT pt. II, § 4-503 Note 1.
Regarding spendthrift trusts-"There is no sound justification for permitting a
debtor . . . to shield from creditors assets [like beneficial interests in spendthrift
trusts] because local law does not allow creditors to reach its interest." Id. pt. I, at
197.
Regarding inchoate dower---"There does not seem to be any sound policy reason
why a spouse's dower or curtesy rights should come ahead of creditors." Id. pt. II,
§ 4-601 Note 16.
35. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
36. For example, where state wage garnishment laws were found destructive of
national policy, they were preempted in favor of an overriding federal standard set
out in the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671-77 (1970). Title I of this act
is also pertinent in that it preempts state disclosure rules applicable in consumer
credit transactions.
A more recent example is the Federal Warranty Act (actually, the MagnusonMoss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301,
et seq. (Supp. I, 1975), wherein certain aspects of state products liability law found to
be inconsistent with national policy were entirely displaced.
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since the Commission was bold enough to propose amendments
both to the Federal Judicial Code and to the federal tax statutes,
when they produced unacceptable results for bankruptcy.37
Did the Bankruptcy Commission perceive the bankruptcy court
as the only forum having any significant impact on the debtorcreditor relationship? If it did, then that would appear to be a rather
narrow perspective of the boundaries of the debtor-creditor legal
universe. 3' As previously discussed, other forums play a significant role, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in debtor-creditor
matters.39
Was the Commission deterred by a lack of political nerve? Did
it fear going to the public at large to test out the wisdom and
political acceptability of the changes in the debtor-creditor relationship which it had proposed? It is, after all, far simpler to get enacted a bankruptcy act which will, for the most part, be scrutinized
only by the bankruptcy community. A far more formidable job is
faced by the proposer of federal preemptive legislation that would so
markedly impact on important and sensitive areas of state law dealing with property rights and the debtor-creditor relationship. Not
only do such proponents have to persuade a much larger audience
-the state bar associations, the American Bar Association Committees beyond its bankruptcy committee, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, the many consumer and business groups,
etc.-of the intrinsic merits of their proposals, they must equally persuade this audience that federal preemptive legislation, rather than
uniform state legislation, is for these specific proposals both wise
and politically correct under our federal system.40
But generating the tension-creating situations which have been
described is too high a price to pay for this lack of political nerve,
if, in fact, it existed. Equally important, if the nonbankruptcy laws
are as adverse to the debtor-creditor relationship as the Commission
has suggested, then should not the forum to discuss their change
(either by state legislation or federal preemptive action) be the larger
37. REPORT pt. II, at 293-300.
38. See text accompanying notes 48-49 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
40. Another tactical advantage exists in favor of the dedicated law reformer by
seeking at this point in time only to propose change in the Bankruptcy Act. Not
only does that avoid the difficult (and more frustrating) job of obtaining uniform
state or federal preemptive laws, but if adopted, the Bankruptcy Act may serve as a
magnet for the nonbankruptcy law to follow. Professor Kennedy, among others, has
recognized the existence of this phenomenon: "It is of course to be anticipated that
the existence of any federal exemption allowance will exert a powerful pressure to bring
state exemption up to the federal figure." Kennedy, supra note 18, at 452.
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audience and not just the smaller bankruptcy community? Should
not the wisdom of this large audience be consulted? In fact, does
it not have a right to be consulted?
3.

Uniformity

Failure to achieve "uniformity" in all of the bankruptcy courts
was another reason often articulated by the Bankruptcy Commission to justify its proposals that generate these tension-creating situations. Since the Constitution authorizes the Congress to enact
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, '4 a point often made
by the Commission was that such uniformity could not be achieved
where the results in individual bankruptcy courts depended upon
the different state laws on a particular subject. 42 One wonders if the
Bankruptcy Commission really believed its own statement that uniform results in all bankruptcy courts are needed or even desirable.
in this respect, it is worth noting that the Commission was quite
content to leave critical aspects of bankruptcy administration to be
determined not by a single uniform bankruptcy rule, but, by state
(and therefore nonuniform) law. For example, determining who is
or who is not a creditor of the bankrupt appears largely to be left to
state law. Similarly, defining what is property which passes to the
bankrupt estate is left to state law; and as the Commission itself at
page 194 in Part I of the Report states: " . . . this reference has not
proved too troublesome, and what difficulty it may create is far overshadowed by the difficulty of codifying rules of property solely for the
purpose of bankruptcy administration."
In any case, these statements about uniformity are more of a play
with words than a serious legal problem. The definition of what
the word "uniform" means in the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution has been long settled; and the Supreme Court has made clear
that it does not require that the results be the same in the bankruptcy
courts of the different states and that there is, indeed, much justice
in applying in bankruptcy the state law with respect to which the
parties originally contracted.43
41. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl.
4.
42. See, e.g., REPORT pt. I, at 171 ("reference to nonbankruptcy law to determine exemptions . . . [has] caused substantial nonuniformity").
43. Hanover Nat'l. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902). The Court justifies
this result on the ground that it
[i]s not unjust [to apply state law in bankruptcy], as every debt is contracted
with reference to the rights of the parties thereto under existing [state] exemption
laws. . . . It is quite proper, therefore, to confine [the bankruptcy system's]
operation to such property as other [nonbankruptcy] legal process could
reach.
Id. at 189-90.
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Nevertheless, much can be said for having one law govern debtorcreditor law throughout the nation. If this is the goal which the
Commission really was urging, then would it not be better achieved
by either uniform state action or federal preemptive legislation, as
has already been discussed? 4 If, indeed, there is merit to the Bankruptcy Commission's argument that debtor-creditor rights should not
vary in different bankruptcy courts, then why should they vary when
the same parties appear in a nonbankruptcy forum across the street?
The Commission's proposals do not produce "uniformity" in this
much broader, national, and more useful sense of the word. Worse,
the rather high and counterproductive price to be paid for the Bankruptcy Commission's unduly narrow view of "uniformity" is the tension-creating situations which have been described already.
4.

Increase the Assets of the Estate

The Bankruptcy Commission sought to justify at least one of its
tension-creating proposals on the ground that it would increase the
amount available for the bankrupt estate. Specifically, that was
one of the reasons used to justify the elimination in bankruptcy of inchoate dower or its statutory equivalents.45
The Commission, of course, states a truth. A bankrupt's estate
can be increased by a rule that invalidates in bankruptcy some third
party's property rights. But one hopes that the Commission was not
serious in pushing this point. Constitutional limitations aside, one
simply cannot within the notions of fair play accept the idea that
third party rights should be confiscated for the benefit of somebody's
creditors, simply because that somebody goes bankrupt. Justification for changing rules solely in the bankruptcy forum must be based
on firmer ground than this."
5.

Administrative Convenience

Lastly, the Commission has justified its tension-creating proposals on the ground that they would serve the administrative conven44. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
45. "To ... enhance the market value of property of the estate, dower,
curtesy, and similar statutory interests are not recognized." REPORT pt. II, § 4-601
Note 11.
46. In other contexts, the Bankruptcy Commission seemed to have recognized
that one's property ought not be sacrificed to pay claims of somebody else's creditors.
The Commission proposes to eliminate the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4
(1931), under which a trustee in bankruptcy may recover property of a third party
not otherwise available to creditors under nonbankruptcy, fraudulent, or voidable
transfer law. REPORT pt. II, § 4-604 Note 4. Having done this, the Commission curiously took the inconsistent position of making "fraudulent" in bankruptcy transfers
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ience of bankruptcy officials. Again, this is one of the justifications used to invalidate inchoate dower or, to use the words of the
Commission, "to facilitate administration"
and to avoid "the com47
plexity of the [valuation] problem.
If parties and courts beyond bankruptcy can and do surmount
these inconveniences and complexities, one expects and presumes
that bankruptcy officials are equally hardy and can do likewise.
II.

THE PROPER USE OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY POWER

A.

The Bankruptcy Commission's Basic Errors

So much for the reasons given by the Commission to justify its
tension-creating proposals. None seem particularly persuasive.
Yet, the Commission was composed of wise and learned men. Why,
then, did they reach these results? With respect, I am inclined to
think that the Commission's actions are largely attributable to two
basic errors in its overall thinking: (1) the Commission viewed its
assignment from far too narrow a perspective, and (2) the Commission failed to appreciate the appropriate and unique role of the
bankruptcy system in our law.
1. Narrow Perspective
The Bankruptcy Commission seems to have been hypnotized by
what was going on only in the bankruptcy courts. It appears that
it conceived its authority as a fairly limited one-namely, the writing
of a new bankruptcy statute. 48 Putting it another way, the boundaries of the universe which the Bankruptcy Commission conceived
was the bankruptcy court alone. So long as its proposals appeared
to make that court run smoothly and so long as the results taking
place in that court seemed to be "fair," then the Commission was
satisfied.
It is regrettable that the Commission operated from so narrow a
perspective. Involved is a far bigger universe-namely, the totality
of the law of debtor-creditor relationships.49 Sound proposals for
that are perfectly valid outside of bankruptcy. See note 32 supra and accompanying
text.
47. See REPORT pt. II, § 4-601 Notes 11 & 15.
48. The Bankruptcy Commission, on the first page of its report, states that it
"was established to 'study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes' in the Bankruptcy Act." REPORT pt. I, at 1.
49. It was recognized early that the constitutional power granted to Congress to
enact uniform bankruptcy laws might include the power to affect all debtor-creditor
relationships, not just those in bankruptcy.
It is bankruptciesand not bankruptcy that is to be the object of those uniform
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change in this universe cannot be limited to how the debtor-creditor
relationship will be governed only in the bankruptcy court. They
must equally take into consideration their impact in the nonbankruptcy forums as well. Producing what appears to be "fairness"
only in the bankruptcy court may not really be "fair" in this much
larger picture. Indeed, apparent tranquility in the bankruptcy forum
is only an illusion if there are storms of tension beyond. As I have
argued, it is these storms of tension which the Bankruptcy Commission has in reality produced. A more orderly universe of the
entire creditor-debtor relationship can be accomplished, but to do so
requires a rejection of the Bankruptcy Commission's tunnel vision
of what are its boundaries.
2.

Appropriate Role of Bankruptcy System

Closely related to the Bankruptcy Commission's narrow perspective was its failure to appreciate what is the appropriate and
unique role which the bankruptcy courts are intended to play in the
total universe of debtor-creditor law. Putting it another way, it was
never contemplated that the bankruptcy system operate in a vacuum.
Rather, it was established to obtain and achieve certain unique objectives that cannot be obtained elsewhere.
The function of bankruptcy is not to derogate from the general
debtor-creditor law; rather, it is to support it. Bankruptcy's unique
function is to provide a forum of last resort-more or less of a safety
valve to give relief when the outside rules governing debtor-creditor
relationships become unbearable.50
But, like any well-designed
safety valve, the bankruptcy system must have two characteristics:
First, it should not be engineered to go off too soon, and second, it
should not be engineered to interfere with the normal functioning
of the outside machine. Thus, the best engineered banruptcy syslaws ....
[T]hat a statute may be "on the subject of bankruptcy" without
being technically a "bankruptcy law"-in other words, that any National law
which deals with inability to pay debts and which is uniform throughout the
country is a law "on the subject of bankruptcy."
Statement made in 1837 by Senator Thomas H. Benton, quoted in C. WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY

IN

U.S.

HISTORY

8 (1935).

See also Continental I11.Nat'l Bank &

Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 672-73 (1935): "[T]he 'subject of
bankruptcies' was nothing less than 'the subject of the relations between an insolvent
or non-paying or fraudulent debtor, and his creditors, extending to his and their
relief'."
50. The Canadians have expressed this point well. Their chapter which discusses bankruptcy is entitled "The Last Resort Solution" and starts with these words:
"When all else fails, bankruptcy is needed by both creditors and debtors." Report
of the Study Committee on Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation 101 (Canada
1970).
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tern is one that supports, permits, and, indeed, encourages to the
maximum extent possible the resolution of debtor-creditor problems
outside of bankruptcy before the safety valve of bankruptcy is activated. 5'
As this paper seeks to demonstrate, the Commission either did
not accept or did not appreciate this overriding bankruptcy goalthe goal that permits nonbankruptcy law to operate with a minimum
of interference from the bankruptcy system.52
B.

Use-When the Bankruptcy Act May Be Used to
Interfere With State Law

When, then, may a bankruptcy statute interfere with the nonbankruptcy rules? The answer ought to be fairly clear: Only when
that is required to accomplish some unique objective for which bankruptcy was established as a separate institution in our legal system.
Failure of bankruptcy statute drafters to exercise discipline by adhering strictly to this principle brings about the counterproductive
consequences and tension-creating situations which have already
been described. This is so, even when departure from the principle
is done in the name of law reform. Useful law reform with respect
51. Judge Lord's statement, while stated in another context, strikes me as capturing what ought to be the appropriate philosophy of the bankruptcy statute. In
In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1966), he stated:
"[There] are considerations particularly impelling upon the bankruptcy court, which,
charged with responsibility for the liquidation of business misfortunes, has a corresponding interest in keeping businesses afloat. . . . The bankruptcy court has no
desire to force the entrance of more small businesses through its portals."
See also Bankruptcy and Insolvency Study, supra note 50, 3.1.42, at 99 which
emphasizes the desirability that "all debtors should try to pay their due debts, without resorting to bankruptcy .... "
52. The proof of this pudding is, like any other pudding, in its eating; and my
paper to this point has sought to demonstrate that the actual and specific results of
the Commission's pudding may give all of us a rather bad stomach ache. The
results which actually will take place in practice under the Commission's proposals
are what really count. Nevertheless, those interested in the more conceptual aspects
of the Commission's work might find interesting reading in what the Commission
designated "A Philosophical Basis for a Federal Bankruptcy Act." REPORT pt. I,
ch. 3. That chapter strikes me as an apology for the Bankruptcy Commission's
proposals rather than a carefully analyzed and consistent statement of what are or
should be the unique bankruptcy goals. The chapter has grist for everybody's mill,
including mine. For my mill, I liked its statement that the internal goals of bankwptcy should "comport with and support the external goals" and should "discourage ill-founded petitions." But these nice-sounding words became rather hollow
as a result of what struck me as the Commission's emphasis on the paramountcy of
the "internal goals" of the bankruptcy system over the "external goals" of the open
credit economy, particularly when among these paramount internal goals are "open
access . . . to the bankruptcy process," and how "the [bankruptcy] process should
encourage resort to it." See REPORT pt. I, at 75. See also note 51 supra.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 26:3

to bad nonbankruptcy law can be accomplished only by changing
that bad law for all purposes-not just for bankruptcy purposes.
In seeking to define what are the unique bankruptcy objectives,
it might be helpful to ignore temporarily the fact that the United
States Constitution lodges federal power in Congress to enact a bankruptcy statute and that such a statute, under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution, displaces all contrary state laws. Consequently,
one charged with writing a federal bankruptcy statute in the United
States incidentally picks up the power to change state law. But
that exactly may have been the nub of the problem. As conventional
wisdom tells us, one having power, unless he carefully restrains
himself, will have a tendency to expand the use of that power, even
beyond the realm for which it was intended.53 Could this tendency
have been at work, sub silentio, in the Bankruptcy Commission?
The Commission was given the authority and power to write a federal supreme statute. They often observed what they conceived to
be bad debtor-creditor law in the nonbankruptcy system. Regrettably and unwisely, they used their federal power to make proposals
which attempt to correct that bad nonbankruptcy law, even though
such proposals had nothing to do with any unique bankruptcy objective.
However, one can imagine systems wherein the bankruptcy statute is written by the very same legislature that writes the nonbankruptcy rules. Indeed, such legal systems actually exist. If one
were drafting a bankruptcy statute under that kind of legal system,
that statute would hardly be the vehicle used to rearrange what was
conceived to be bad nonbankruptcy rules. Rather, the bankruptcy
statute would be limited only to those things which are essential for
the unique purposes of bankruptcy. If reform of the nonbankruptcy
rules were necessary, then that would be accomplished by changing
those rules themselves.
It is submitted that this is exactly how the Bankruptcy Commission should have proceeded. It should have disciplined itself to
write a bankruptcy statute whose specific proposals were directed
only at achieving those objectives which are unique to bankruptcy.

53. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R. J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d
Cir. 1974), which recognized the not unfamiliar result of "overkill" when a legal principle completely valid in its original context is extended so far that the mischief caused
may be equal to the original disorder sought to be remedied.
In a lecture before the Ohio Supreme Court and Ohio State Bar Association on
May 15, 1975, Dean Griswold also noted and criticized the growing tendency, particularly in the federal arena, to inflate legal principles to cover areas never intended
by the original principle. [Unpublished]
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It should have disdained using the federal bankruptcy power simply
to attempt to bring about reform in nonbankruptcy rules.
1. The Unique Bankruptcy Objectives
What, then, are the unique objectives which a bankruptcy system is established to accomplish. Actually, there seems to be a great
deal of agreement about them. While the following list of these objectives may not be exclusive, it probably contains most that are
commonly accepted today.
From the debtor's point of view, the unique objectives to be served
by the bankruptcy system are the following:
1. Relief from an overburden of debts.
2. In nonliquidation cases, the power to continue in business for
reasonable periods of time while seeking to work out a settlement
of the debtor-creditor problem.
From the creditor's point of view, the unique objectives sought
to be served by the bankruptcy system are the following:
1. The ending of the race of diligence for the debtor's assets.
2. The collection of the debtor's assets which are available to
creditors under nonbankruptcy law.
3. The "equal" sharing of those assets or, more precisely, the
distribution of those assets according to a bankruptcy set of priorities.54
Some of the implications that flow from each of the above objectives will now be discussed.
a. Relief From Overburden of Debts. One of the fundamental
and unique objectives for establishing bankruptcy as a separate legal
institution is to give relief to an honest debtor from an overburden
of debts which he can no longer handle. Thus, discharge rules quite
properly belong in a bankruptcy act, even though they override
important rights created by nonbankruptcy law. However, bankruptcy as we know it today simply would not exist without the availability of a discharge to the debtor. Further, it is worth noting
that the bankruptcy court today is the only place in the American
legal system where a discharge of debts can be obtained, illustrating rather dramatically how unique the discharge concept is to the
federal bankruptcy system.
54. In the Canadian Report, it is succinctly stated: "from the viewpoint of the
creditors, bankruptcy provides a system of collective execution and equitable distribution of the assets of a failing debtor. On the other hand, to the debtor, bankruptcy
represents the means of obtaining relief from an overwhelming burden of debt and
the opportunity to make a new financial start in life. Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Study, supra note 50, 3.2.001 at 101.
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Rather obviously, the ability to get a discharge "encourages"
debtors to hurry through the bankruptcy doors rather than seeking
to resolve their creditor problems outside of bankruptcy. Yet, this
bankruptcy safety valve of discharge is essential if relief is to be
granted in the American legal system from the pressure of overburdening debt. But, as has been previously suggested, even this
safety valve must be carefully engineered to avoid undue interference with or abuse of the normal workings of the nonbankruptcy
system. This can and has largely been accomplished by limiting
the kinds of debtors who may obtain the discharge," the frequency
with which they can obtain it,565 7and, finally, the kinds of debts
which are subject to the discharge.
One should be careful of carrying this idea too far. It is relief
from an overburden of debts which the bankruptcy system was
uniquely set up to accomplish, and not the "rehabilitation" of the
debtor which the Bankruptcy Commission (and a good many others)
are prone to emphasize. Quite true, discharge, by permitting the
accumulation of new assets free of past creditors' claims to them,
makes it possible for one to become an economically productive
person. 58 In this sense, discharge assists in the rehabilitation process. But the means with which, and the conditions under which,
the debtor actually accumulates those new assets are really determined by the nonbankruptcy rather than the bankruptcy system.
To illustrate, a debtor, after financial failure, may need a new job or
a new business with which to accumulate new wealth and, thus,
start afresh. But the bankruptcy system is not set up nor particularly well-suited to provide discharged debtors with such jobs or new
businesses. That function instead is allocated to the nonbankruptcy
system. By the same token, the bankruptcy system cannot, and
should not, guarantee the minimum wage or profit to be earned on
a post-bankruptcy job or business. Nor is the bankruptcy system

55. See section 14(c) of the present Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970);
section 4-505(a) of the proposed Act, REPORT pt. II, § 4-505(a) (providing which
debtors may obtain the discharge).
56. Six years under section 14(c) of present Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1970), and
five years under section 4-505(a) of the proposed Act, REPORT pt. II, § 4-505(a).
However, under the proposed Act, the five-year period could be ignored if the court
found that enforcing it would produce "undue hardship." Id. § 4-505(a)(7).
57. See section 17 of the present Act, I1 U.S.C. § 35 (1970), and section 4-506
of the proposed Act, REPORT pt. II, § 4-506.
58. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) where the Court emphasized that bankruptcy affords the bankrupt "a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting
debt."
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the appropriate vehicle for providing welfare benefits if the discharged debtor is unable to start a business or get a job. Most
would agree that all of these functions are to be performed by the
nonbankruptcy system.
From this, it would seem to follow that it is equally the role of
the nonbankruptcy system to determine a debtor's exemptions.
Exemptions are really only one narrow aspect of the total wherewithal needed by a debtor to stay alive and to start afresh after
financial distress, in or out of bankruptcy, has befallen him. Indeed, exemption laws are closely related to the welfare role which
society must play; and, again, almost all agree that welfare is a function allocated to the nonbankruptcy system. 59 Thus, it seems incongruous for a bankruptcy statute to define exemptions which, after
all, are only a single and narrow aspect of the so-called "rehabilitation" devices;, that is, the means which a debtor needs to get his
"fresh start" after financial distress. Rather, it seems best to leave
it to nonbankruptcy law to develop exemptions as part of a total and
coordinated package of benefits-e.g., job, minimum wage, welfare,
-which are needed for a debtor's "rehabilitation."
As mentioned earlier, if there is some convincing national need
to make exemptions uniform throughout the country, then that
national uniformity ought to be mandated for every situation where
a debtor faces financial distress and not simply the bankruptcy
case-something which can be accomplished either by uniform state
action or by federal preemptive legislation.60 However, adopting
exemptions only for bankruptcy generates another tension-creating
situation without serving any unique bankruptcy goal.
b. Continue in Business in Nonliquidation Cases. In nonliquidation cases, a unique bankruptcy objective is to permit a debtor to continue in business for reasonable periods of time while trying to work out a settlement with his creditors. This unique objective seems to justify bankruptcy rules which stay for that reasonable
period the enforcement of both unsecured and secured claims.61
It equally supports rules permitting the debtor to use the collateral
belonging to a secured party, provided that the secured party's positibn is fully protected.62
59. Even the Bankruptcy Commission recognized that a major purpose for
exemptions is "that the debtor not be left destitute." REPORT pt. I, at 172.
60. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
61. See R. BANKRUPTCY P. 11-44 Such stay rules are now found in the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, e.g., Rule 11-44. Section 4-501 of the proposed Bankruptcy
Act would do likewise. REPORT pt. II, § 4-501.
62. See REPORT pt. II, § 2-203(b) and accompanying notes. It is crucial that
these rules be tailored to assure that the secured party's position is, in fact, pro-
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c. Ending Race of Diligence. Bankruptcy substitutes a procedure whereby creditors act collectively rather than individually.
In other words, a unique objective of bankruptcy is to end the
race of diligence by individual creditors for the debtor's assets.
This objective justifies bankruptcy rules which stay the nonbankruptcy right of the creditor to pursue his state-created enforcement
remedies.6 3 It also supports the preference-avoidance rules which
will be discussed below in connection with the equality in bankruptcy-distribution objectives.
d. Collection of Debtor's Assets. Another fundamental bankruptcy objective is to permit the collection by some official of assets
which creditors could have obtained outside of bankruptcy. This
supports rules, such as those found in section 70(C) 6 4 of the present
Bankruptcy Act and section 4-604(a) of the proposed Act wherein
the trustee may obtain for the estate all assets available to a judiciallien creditor, whether or not such a judicial-lien creditor exists. In
fact, this judicial-lien creditor rule does not really change for bankruptcy purposes a nonbankruptcy rule, even though at first blush
it may appear to do so. Quite to the contrary, the judicial-lien creditor bankruptcy rule fully supports and is completely consistent
with nonbankruptcy law rather than interfering with or derogating
from it. This is true because the levying-creditor rule simply gives
to creditors in bankruptcy exactly what they probably would have
reached outside the bankruptcy if they had not been stopped by the
bankruptcy bell.
e. Share "Equally" According to Bankruptcy Priority Scheme.
Once the assets are collected for the estate, it is well-accepted that
a fundamental and unique purpose of bankruptcy is to distribute
them "equally" among the creditors. 65 More precisely, the distribution isn't exactly equal. Rather, it is equal among creditors of the
same priority class. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the definition of the various priority classes is to be made by the bankruptcy system; and, of course, this "equal" treatment bankruptcy
objective is closely related to and intertwined with the ending of the
race of diligence previously discussed.
tected. If this is not done, then the practical end result is to generate, without justification, a tension-creating situation wherein security, fully valid outside of bankruptcy, is diminished within bankruptcy.
63. For examples of such stay rules in the present Bankruptcy Act see R.
BANKRUPTCY P. 401, 601, 11-44; they are also found in the proposed Bankruptcy
Act. See REPORT pt. II, § 4-501.
64. 11 U.S.C. § l10(c) (1970).
65. Subject, however, to their respective priority class. See text accompanying
notes 72-76 infra.
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This unique "equal treatment" bankruptcy objective supports
the preference-avoidance rules found in section 60 of the present
Bankruptcy Act 66 and section 4-607 of the proposed Act. Little,
if anything, would be left in the debtor's estate at the time of
bankruptcy against which to apply the unique "equal treatment"
objective, unless some kind of a preference-avoidance rule was
adopted. Without such a rule, the bankrupt estate would be left
"with only tag ends and remnants of unencumbered assets. 67

Quite obviously, preference-avoidance

rules interfere rather

drastically with a creditor's nonbankruptcy right to receive and retain payment of his lawful debts. In this sense, they do encourage
other creditors to precipitate a bankruptcy to get the advantage

of avoidance. 68 However, this possibility is limited and undue interference with the new bankruptcy system is controlled by limiting
(1) the suspect period for preference avoidance, 69 (2) the kinds of pay-

ments which can be recovered as a preference, 70 and (3) the kinds of
creditors (i.e., those who have reasonable cause to believe of the

debtor's insolvency) who must disgorge the preference.7'
f. Bankruptcy Priority System. The bankruptcy goal of distributing assets to creditors according to bankruptcy-determined
priority classes also sanctions the writing of bankruptcy rules which
invalidate state attempts to interfere with that priority system.
Such rules include those which are now found in sections 67(c)(1)
(A) and (B) of the present Bankruptcy Act 72 wherein nonbankruptcy66. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
67. See REPORT pt. I, p. 202, citing Seligson, The Code and Bankruptcy Act:
Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 292
(1967), quoting 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 60.02-.03 (14th ed. 1964).
68. See, e.g., Holahan & Hemmings, Judicial Expansion of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 80 COM. L.J. 102, 110 (March, 1975).
69. This period is limited to 4 months under section 60A of the present Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970), while under the proposed Bankruptcy Act it
is 3 months generally and 12 months for insiders. REPORT pt. II, § 4-607(a).
Query: Are these periods too long? One must remember that state law considers
these preferences to be debt transactions which were finally and lawfully concluded
by a valid payment (or other property transfer). Is it really desirable that the expectations which creditors had regarding the lawfulness and finality of the payments
they received be kept on tenterhooks and subject to reopening for periods as long
as three months (and, indeed, in some cases as long as twelve months)? Wouldn't
the unique bankruptcy objectives which support preference-avoidance be satisfactorily achieved, with much less of a tension-creating situation, by a shorter preference-avoidance period?
70. See id. §§ 4-607(b) & (c).
71. The reasonable-cause-to-believe element is applicable to all cases under
section 60B of the present Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). Under the proposed Bankruptcy Act, it would be applicable only to insiders who receive preferences more than
3 but less than 12 months before bankruptcy. REPORT pt. II, § 4-607(a)(2).
72. 11 U.S.C. §§ 107(c)(1)(A) & (B) (1970).
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created statutory liens are invalidated. Indeed, these particular
bankruptcy sections do not interfere in any real sense with rights
and expectations created by nonbankruptcy law. Quite to the contrary, these sections essentially do nothing more than define rather
clumsy and apparent attempts by nonbankruptcy law to create rights
bankruptcy, but will have no signifiwhich will operate only in 73
cance outside the bankruptcy.
Surely, nonbankruptcy law owes the same duty to support the
74
it.
bankruptcy system as the bankruptcy system owes to support

Thus, where nonbankruptcy rules seek to create "rights" or "liens"
intended to have meaning only for bankruptcy purposes, then the
bankruptcy statute is fully justified in striking them down.75
For similar reasons, the invalidation of bankruptcy termination
clauses is equally justified. 76 Here again is an example of nonbankruptcy law seeking to give rights which will have meaning only
in bankruptcy, but not elsewhere. In particular, bankruptcy termination clauses seek to deny to creditors in bankruptcy the benefit
of contracts and leases which otherwise would have been available
to them outside of bankruptcy.
SUMMARY

As previously stated, the itemization above is probably not the
exclusive list of unique and fundamental objectives which warrant a bankruptcy statute interfering with nonbankruptcy law.
But the point should be clear. The Bankruptcy Act is not the vehicle to reform nonbankruptcy law, even though those who draft
the Bankruptcy Act find fault with it. If those nonbankruptcy laws
are "evil," then the remedy should be to eliminate the evil for all
73. See Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 5 (1967).
Professor Kennedy states: "As the legislative reports accompanying the statutory
lien bills point out, this clause (A) of section 67(c)(1) strikes at patent priorities which
are disguised as liens." Id. at 6. With respect to clause (B) of Section 67(c)(1),
Professor Kennedy states:
The introduction of the bona fide purchaser test into the Bankruptcy Act's
scheme for adjusting the rights of statutory lienors rests on the premise
that if a statutory lien does not follow the property into the hands of a
bona fide purchaser, it is primarily a statutory device for establishing
priority among competing creditors and ought not prevail as against the
order of priorities established by section 64 in the event of bankruptcy.
Id. at 7.
74. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra.
75. However, the invalidation of statutory liens that are fully efficacious for nonbankruptcy purposes is not justified. See text accompanying note 22 supra, regarding the Bankruptcy Commission's proposal to invalidate such statutory liens,
particularly those statutory liens intended to secure the payment of income taxes.
76. See REPORT pt. II, § 4-602(b)(1).
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debtor-creditor purposes through uniform state or federal preemptive legislation. However, the Bankruptcy Act itself should not interfere with nonbankruptcy law unless that is essential to accomplish
some fundamental bankruptcy goals-that is, a goal which supports
the establishment of bankruptcy as a separate legal institution intended to serve unique objectives. Even then, appropriate safeguards must be engineered into these Bankruptcy Act interferences
to assure that their tension-creating effects are minimized.
When these principles are not carefully followed, then the
Bankruptcy Act's interference with nonbankruptcy law does not bring
about reform or solve the problem of "bad" creditor-debtor law.
Quite to the contrary, that "bad" law continues to exist in the numerous debtor-creditor situations that will continue to be governed
by the nonbankruptcy law. Moreover, this kind of interference
by the Bankruptcy Act is actually counterproductive. It sets up
tension-creating situations in which persons are encouraged to act
outside of bankruptcy or to precipitate (or to avoid) bankruptcy for
reasons which have little, if anything, to do with the singular and
unique purposes which underlie the establishment of our bankruptcy
system. Further, it leaves parties at the time of contracting uncertain as to which law will ultimately govern, since that will depend On
the happenstance of bankruptcy.
There is much good in the Bankruptcy Commission's proposed
Act. But its proposals which generate the described tension-creating situations detract from its final product. These tension-creating proposals can be attributed to two factors: First, the Commission's unduly narrow perspective of the debtor-creditor universe,
and second, the Commission's failure to appreciate the appropriate
and unique role of the bankruptcy system in the universe of debtorcreditor law. A review of the Commission's proposed Act seems to
be in order so that these tension-creating situations can be identified
and then eliminated. Most, although probably not all, of these
tension-creating situations have already been pinpointed in this
article, and finding the others should not prove to be a particularly
burdensome job. The totality of debtor-creditor law will be far
more orderly for having done so.

